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THE EFFECT ON RIVALS WHEN FIRMS EMERGE FROM BANKRUPTCY 
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Abstract 
 
Studies on the announcement effects of bankruptcy filings have found that when a firm files for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection its shareholders suffer significant losses.  A recent paper extends these 
findings by investigating the announcement effect on rival companies, while another examines the 
equity performance of firms emerging from bankruptcy.  We combine these two lines of inquiry by 
examining the effect on rivals when a firm emerges from the protection of Chapter 11.  We find both 
significant negative stock market returns and significant negative revisions in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for rivals of successfully reorganized companies.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Bankruptcy can be a tremendously traumatic 
experience for a company.  The primary purpose of the 
American bankruptcy code, through its Chapter 11, is 
to provide temporary respite from financial obligations 
to companies with sufficiently high probability of 
reorganizing those obligations successfully.  A 
successful reorganization would allow the company to 
ultimately emerge from bankruptcy as a much more 
financially healthy competitor.   
Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) study the 
long-term stock market performance of firms emerging 
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  They report that in the 
first 200 days after shedding the cover of Chapter 11, 
abnormal stock returns average anywhere from +24.6 
percent to +138.8 percent depending on methodology.  
Interestingly, the former is nearly identical in 
magnitude, but opposite in sign, to the -24.3 percent 
abnormal return reported by Bradley and Rosenzweig 
(1992) for companies entering Chapter 11 protection.    
Lang and Stulz (1992) extend the analysis to the 
intra-industry effects of bankruptcy by examining the 
abnormal stock returns of rivals of companies filing 
Chapter 11. Lang and Stulz point out that there are two 
potential market reactions to the news of a 
competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and that 
predicting which of these dominates the other is 
difficult to predict.  It is possible that a rival’s 
bankruptcy gives the remaining firms a competitive 
advantage such as, for example, a greater share of the 
product market.  If a competitive advantage is 
conveyed by a rival’s bankruptcy, and the advantage is 
significant, the market reaction should be significantly 
positive.  Lang and Stulz term this potential positive 
market reaction the competitive effect.  However, the 
news of a bankrupt competitor could also indicate 
some underlying problem common to all firms in the 
industry.  In this case, a surprise Chapter 11 
announcement may lead to a negative market reaction 
that spreads throughout the industry.  This potential 
negative market reaction is termed the contagion effect.  
Lang and Stulz argue that ultimately the dominant 
market reaction is an empirical question.  Their results 
show significantly negative abnormal returns of  –1.0 
percent for a portfolio comprised of rival companies 
and conclude that the contagion effect dominates the 
competitive effect for their sample of rival firms.  That 
is, the effect of bankruptcy can be characterized as a 
contagion that spreads to other companies in the 
industry. 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) separate 
rival firms into those that file for bankruptcy 
themselves over the subsequent three years, and those 
that do not.  They suggest that when a bankruptcy 
announcement is made, the market makes an unbiased 
prediction of the future bankruptcy probability of rival 
firms.  However, they use actual reported bankruptcies 
over the subsequent three-year period as a proxy for 
the market’s revised bankruptcy probabilities.  They 
argue that firms predicted to fail, i.e., those that 
subsequently do fail, are expected to suffer declines in 
value due to the contagion effect, while those predicted 
to continue operations, i.e., those that do not fail over 
the subsequent three years, should gain in value due to 
the competitive effect.  Consistent with Lang and 
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Stulz’ findings, Ferris, Jayaraman and Makhija report a 
significant average negative announcement effect of 
–0.56 percent.   Moreover and consistent with their 
expectations, for the three days surrounding the 
bankruptcy announcement sample firms predicted to 
fail have negative stock returns that average –4.68 
percent in value, however, firms predicted to remain 
solvent also have negative stock returns that average 
–0.49 percent.  They conclude that the contagion effect 
dominates the competitive effect for all rivals, even 
those predicted to remain solvent. 
 The primary question we wish to answer is 
whether there is a competitive or contagion 
intra-industry effect when companies emerge from the 
protection of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Modifying the 
Lang and Stulz (1992) argument, when a firm emerges 
from bankruptcy the industry becomes more 
competitive with the reintroduction of a presumably 
financially healthy rival.  Hence, the competitive effect 
in this case should lead to a negative market reaction 
for rivals.  On the other hand, the emergence of a rival 
from bankruptcy could also indicate a reinvigorated 
industry and the contagion effect would be positive 
news for the industry and lead to positive market 
reactions for rivals.  In other words, when entering 
Chapter 11 sickness is contagious, but when exiting 
from Chapter 11 health is contagious.   
We find a significantly positive reaction for our 
sample of 60 firms emerging from bankruptcy that 
averages 7.87 percent over the three-day window 
centered on the announcement date.  This compares to 
around 3.5 percent reported by Eberhart, et al (1999), 
depending on the method used to calculate abnormal 
returns.  Over the same three-day window we find a 
significantly negative –0.40 percent average return for 
our sample of 3,270 rivals.  Hence, although the 
contagion effect dominates the market reactions of 
rivals when a firm announces filing Chapter 11, 
apparently the competitive effect dominates when 
those firms emerge from bankruptcy.  That is, it is bad 
news for the industry competitors when a rival files for 
Chapter 11 protection, and it is bad news for the 
industry when those same firms emerge from Chapter 
11 protection. 
Like Ferris, et al (1997) we go beyond the market 
reaction in an attempt to explain the range of market 
reactions, both positive and negative.  However, we 
believe that, rather than a simple yes/no bankruptcy 
prediction, it is more likely that market participants use 
the new information provided by their rivals’ 
emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy to revise their 
estimates of future cash flows.   We use abnormal 
revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for 
these estimates and find that not only is there a 
significant decline in expected future cash flows for 
rivals, but forecasters appear to anticipate the bankrupt 
firms’ emergence from Chapter 11 in the months prior 
to the reorganization announcement. 
Finally, although the competitive stock market 
effect dominates the contagion effect, stock market 
reactions are not negative for all rivals.  In fact, it could 
be expected that individual rivals would be affected 
differently by the news of a revitalized competitor.  For 
example, suppose an industry consists of three firms: 
the market leader firm A, a market follower firm B, 
and the bankrupt firm C.  Further, while they are all in 
the same industry suppose firm C’s product line is a 
closer substitute to that of firm B than to that of firm A.  
In this case firm C’s reorganization may weaken the 
competitive position of the market follower, while 
strengthening that of the market leader, and lead to 
opposite market reactions for the rivals.  Earnings 
forecasters are in the best position, not including 
insiders, to distinguish between the expected effect of 
firm C’s reorganization on firms A and B.  Therefore, 
we expect a positive relation between abnormal market 
reactions and abnormal forecast revisions for rivals of 
firms emerging from bankruptcy.  We confirm the 
positive relation formally using regression analysis.   
The negative market reaction, the negative earnings 
forecast revisions, and the positive relation between 
the two all imply that the competitive effect dominates 
the contagion effect for rivals of firms emerging from 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Section II explains our data selection process.  In 
section III, we examine the market response to 
announcements of bankruptcy filings for both the 
filing firm and its rivals.  Section IV examines the 
earnings forecast revisions for the rival companies.  
Conclusions are summarized in section V. 
II.  Sample selection 
 
We compiled our sample of firms emerging from 
bankruptcy using the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) database.   SDC reports the reorganization date, 
which is the date the bankruptcy court accepts the 
reorganization plan.  Our sample consists of firms that 
reorganized between January 1, 1987 and December 
31, 1998.  Obviously, an analysis of intra-industry 
effects requires data from a firm’s industry rivals.  
Following Lang and Stulz (1992), we define a firm’s 
rivals as all firms with the same four-digit Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) code.  Finally, for a rival 
firm to be included in our final sample we require that 
there be sufficient data in both the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) data files and the 
Institutional Brokers Estimation System (IBES) 
earnings forecast database. 
After applying these various requirements our 
final sample includes sixty firms operating in 
forty-eight different four-digit industries that 
announced a bankruptcy filing during the sample 
period.  Competing with these filing firms are 3,270 
rivals. 
III. Stock Market Reaction  
 
We compute standardized abnormal returns following 
Patel (1976) as modified by Mikkelson and Partch 
(1988).  Day 0 is defined as the date the court accepts 
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the firm’s reorganization plan, i.e., the date the firm 
emerges from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  The 
abnormal returns are the difference between the actual 
return and an expected return generated by the market 
model.  We estimate the parameters for the market 
model using daily returns data from day -510 to day 
-251.14  Abnormal returns are generated for both the 
filing firms and an equally weighted portfolio of rival 
firms with the same four-digit SIC code.  Finally, we 
compute the Z-statistic and use it to test for statistical 
significance of standardized abnormal returns and 
cumulative standard abnormal returns (CAR) for 
various windows. 
• Table 1 reports the stock market reaction to 
successful reorganization and emergence from 
bankruptcy protection for both the reorganized firms 
and their rivals.  Consistent with Eberhart, et al (1999), 
we observe a significant positive abnormal stock 
market reaction when the bankruptcy court accepts a 
firm’s reorganization plan.  The average three-day 
CAR (days -1 to +1) for the sample of 60 emerging 
firms is positive 7.87 percent, which with a t-statistic 
of 4.27, is significant below the one percent level.  
Clearly, the market views a firm’s emergence from 
bankruptcy protection as a positive and significant 
informational event. 
• Conversely, the equally weighted portfolio of 
rival firms has a three-day average CAR of -0.40 
percent, which with a t-statistic of –3.15 is also 
significant below the one percent level.  This finding is 
comparable in both size and significance to those 
found at the original Chapter 11 filing by both Lang 
and Stulz (1992), who report a - 1.07 percent reaction 
over the eleven days centered on the filing date, and by 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997), who report a 
-0.56 percent reaction over the a three-day window at 
filing.  Apparently, although the Chapter 11 filing and 
subsequent reorganization produce significantly 
negative and positive average abnormal market 
reactions, respectively, for the filing companies, rival 
firms react negatively at both the original filing and 
subsequent emergence.   
At first glance, these abnormal market reactions 
may appear to be statistically but not economically 
significant.  However, as pointed out by Ferris, et al, 
since the total equity value of the competitor portfolio 
is much larger than the equity value of the individual 
companies filing for bankruptcy, or in our case, 
emerging from bankruptcy, they are significant in 
dollar terms.  Ferris, et al, report that for their sample 
the competitor portfolio loses $3.32 of equity value on 
average for every dollar of equity value lost by the 
bankrupt firms.  
These event study findings indicate that while 
emerging from Chapter 11 protection is very good 
news for reorganized firms it is significantly bad news 
                                               
2.  We use this estimation period because we look at the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the pre-filing period from 
250 days to 31 days prior to the filing. 
for industry rivals.  We now turn our focus to 
determining how the information contained in the 
court’s acceptance of the reorganization plan is 
translated into a negative market reaction for rivals.  
We hypothesize that market participants interpret the 
emergence of a newly healthy competitor as downward 
pressure on expected future cash flows of rivals and 
that this downward pressure leads to lower market 
valuations for those firms.  The next section presents 
our methodology for testing this hypothesis, and the 
results of that test. 
IV. Abnormal Earnings Forecast 
Revisions 
 
To judge whether or not the market reaction for rival 
companies are related to changes in expected cash 
flows we need a proxy for those expectations.  
Earnings analysts help to set the market’s level of 
expected cash flows with their forecasts of future 
earnings.  Similarly, revisions in analyst’s forecasts 
help to reset the market’s expectations at some new 
level.  We use reported earnings forecast revisions 
subsequent to announcements of emergence from 
bankruptcy as a proxy for the changes in the market’s 
expectations of future cash flow from the rival firms.  
Significant earnings revisions after emergence from 
Chapter 11 protection are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the reorganization of a financially 
rejuvenated company leads to revisions in the market’s 
cash flow expectations for rival companies, and their 
subsequent negative abnormal market reaction. 
Following Brous (1992), we measure earnings 
forecast revisions (FR) using the following equation: 
FRi,t = [(Fi,t - Fi,t-1 )/ Pi] x 100    
where Fi,t is the median analyst earnings forecast from 
IBES in month t for the annual earnings per share of 
firm i for the current fiscal year, and Pi is the stock 
price for firm i six months prior to the reorganization 
announcement.  Since previous studies have shown 
that IBES data contain errors, we eliminate a filing 
firm or rival from our sample if FRi,t is more than five 
standard deviations (defined over all firms) from the 
overall mean in any month.  After the initial round of 
data eliminations, the standard deviation is 
recalculated and again firms with observations outside 
five standard deviations are eliminated, and so on until 
there are no observations more than five standard 
deviations from the mean. 
However, both O’Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) 
have shown that raw forecast revisions such as those 
computed using equation 1 can be biased.  O’Brien 
(1988) shows that reported earnings forecasts 
systematically decrease until the actual earnings are 
announced by the firm.  This implies that forecasters 
are systematically overly optimistic when making their 
first earnings forecast for a company.  Brous (1992) 
reports that earnings analysts update their forecasts for 
any specific company only every four to five months.  
That is, on average in any given month only about 20 
percent of forecasts are updated.  This implies that 
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revisions in the median earnings forecast for one 
specific company across all analysts covering that 
company, tend to be serially correlated.  For example, 
if new information is revealed that causes a reduction 
in expected earnings the median forecast will begin to 
fall immediately and will tend to continue falling due 
to the same information for four to five months as all 
analysts get around to updating their forecasts.  To test 
whether the competition of a reorganized firm affects 
cash flow expectations of rivals, we need measures that 
correct for these two effects. 
• To correct for these two expected effects we 
employ a modified version of the Ederington and Goh 
(1998) procedure, which they developed to isolate 
surprise revisions surrounding bond-rating changes.  
Their method, in turn, is a modification of the 
procedure pioneered by Brous (1992) to examine 
earnings forecast revisions following seasoned equity 
offerings.  Following Ederington and Goh, we start by 
randomly choosing 500 firms from the IBES data file.  
Then, for each firm we randomly select a 25-month 
period between January 1984 and December 1990.  
Finally, we pool the resulting data and estimate the 
following equation: 
•  
 FRi,t = -.093 + .085 FR i, t-1 + .085 FR i, t-2 + .081 FR i, t-3 
+ .072 FR i, t-4 + .058 FR i, t-5 + .040 FR i, t-6 + u i,t .    (2) 
 
The negative intercept in this equation (-.093) confirms 
the finding by O’Brien (1988)  that absent new 
information, analysts tend to reduce their forecasts 
over time.  For instance, for a firm with a  P/E ratio of 
12, the negative intercept implies an average revision 
of -1.12% (12 x .093%) each month.  If this 
representative forecast is twelve months out, the 
forecast will decline an additional 12.6 percent on 
average ((1 - .0112)12 - 1= -.126).  The positive 
coefficients on the lagged forecast revisions are 
consistent with Brouse (1992) and indicate that when 
new information is revealed it will continue to affect 
forecast revisions as far as six months into the future.  
For example, suppose on April 1 economic conditions 
unexpectedly improve to a level that will lead all 
analysts to eventually double their end-of-year 
earnings forecasts for a company.  Given Brous’s 
findings, only a fraction of analysts will update their 
forecasts by the end of April.  The remaining analysts 
will update their forecasts with a lag.  Therefore, by the 
end of April the median forecast will only partially 
reflect the better economic conditions and in each 
subsequent month additional analysts will incorporate 
the new information in their end-of-year forecasts.  
This lag will lead to median monthly forecasts that 
incrementally reflect the new information through time 
until all analysts have doubled their forecasts at which 
time the median forecast will be double what it was on 
April 1.  Specifically, in equation 2 the .085 coefficient 
for FRi,t-1 indicates that the median forecast for 
end-of-year earnings is expected to increase by about 
8.5 percent in May, while June’s median forecast 
should increase by about 8.5 percent, and so on for a 
total lagged average cumulative effect of  42.1 percent 
implying that only 58.9 percent of the total revision 
ocurred in the month the new information was 
revealed. 
Using equation 2, each firm’s lagged values of 
FRi,t for all t = -1 to -6, and assuming u i,t is normally 
distributed with mean zero, we calculate the expected 
forecast revision, E(FRi,t). We then define the 
abnormal earnings forecast revision, AFRi,t, as the 
difference between the actual revision in the consensus 
forecast in month t and its expected forecast revision 
calculated as outlined above.  Specifically: 
AFRi,t = FRi,t - E(FRi,t)     (3) 
We use a simple t-test to test the null hypothesis AFRi, 
t  = 0.  Table 2 presents the abnormal earnings forecast 
revisions for the rivals of firms emerging from 
bankruptcy protection.  A general negative trend in 
abnormal forecast revisions during the three months 
prior to emergence may indicate anticipation of the 
pressure on cash flows.  Indeed the reorganization date 
is known in advance.  However, the three most 
negative monthly AFR in the thirteen-month period are 
months t-1 to t+1, where month t=0 is the month the 
bankrupt company emerges from protection. Given 
Brous’s (1992) finding that earnings forecasts can tend 
to become stale as analysts incrementally update them, 
we cumulate abnormal forecast revisions after the 
bond rating downgrade to capture the full effect of 
emergence from bankruptcy on earnings forecast 
revisions using the following equation:  
∑∑∑
=
==
3
0t
ti,
i
ti,
i
}]{AFR[][CAFR  CAFR i  
  (4) 
 
The average CAFR for this four-month period 
after emergence from bankruptcy protection is -0.114, 
which with a t-statistic of -2.96 is significant below the 
1 percent level.  This finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis that as a result of successfully completing 
the Chapter 11 process and thus emerging from 
bankruptcy protection as a more financially healthy 
competitor, analysts revise downward the earnings 
forecasts for rivals of the reorganized companies.  If 
earnings expectations proxy for expected future cash 
flow, this decrease in earnings forecasts may lead to 
the decline in market values we report in table 1. 
We formally test for a relation between earnings 
forecasts and the change in market values of equity 
using regression analysis.  Specifically, we regress the 
cumulative abnormal forecast revisions on the 
cumulative abnormal stock returns over the three-day 
period surrounding the date the bankruptcy court 
accepts the reorganization plan.  In addition, we 
control for other firm-specific information that could 
affect earnings forecast revisions.  Hertzel and Jain 
(1991) and Hertzel and Rees (1998) both indicate that 
because of the serial correlation inherent in the IBES 
data, there is potential for a great deal of contaminating 
information since forecast revisions could reflect 
information released either months prior to or after the 
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bankruptcy filing.  We believe that our methodology of 
calculating abnormal forecast revisions accounts for 
this problem.  However, in order to control for any 
unaccounted for firm-specific information, we include 
two variables in the cross-sectional regression models, 
the pre-announcement cumulative abnormal stock 
return over the interval from Day -250 to Day -30, and 
the post-announcement cumulative abnormal stock 
return over the interval from Day +30 to Day +250. 
These two control variables should capture any other 
firm-specific information that could potentially cause 
analysts to revise their earnings forecasts either prior to 
the announcement or during the four-month period 
during which we cumulate abnormal earnings 
forecasts.  
Results for the cross-sectional regression analysis 
are presented in table 3 and suggest that the stock 
market reaction is strongly and positively related to 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  This finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the acceptance of the 
reorganization plan causes market participants to 
revise downward their cash flow expectations for rival 
companies and that these reduced expectations lead to 
the negative stock market reaction we show in table 1.  
That is, the average competitive stock market effect we 
discover may be due to significant reductions in 
expected future cash flow. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence that the announcement of 
emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
provides a release of new information for both the 
emerging firm and its rivals.  The information comes 
as a surprise as evidenced by the positive stock market 
reaction for announcing firms and the negative 
reaction for their rivals, as well as the subsequent 
negative earnings revisions for the rivals. These two 
effects on rival firms across so many different 
industries imply that, on average, the competitive 
effect, dominates the contagion effect for these firms.  
Moreover, the results of the cross-sectional regression 
show a significant relation between the negative stock 
price reaction for the portfolio of rival firms and 
negative revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  All 
of these findings are consistent with our hypothesis 
that decreases in expected future cash flow as a result 
of increased competitive pressure in the industry 
produce the negative stock market reactions of rival 
companies. 
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Table 1 
Average abnormal returns for announcing firms and industry rivals surrounding reorganization 
announcements 
We estimate average abnormal returns based on the market model around the date of reorganization, Day 0.  The 
market model is estimated over the period from Day -510 to Day -251.  The sample includes 60 announcing firms 
and 3,270 rivals between the years 1987 and 1998.  (*** denotes .01, ** denotes .05, and * denotes .10 levels of 
significance) 
____________________________________________________________________________
__  
Panel A      Panel B 
Announcing firms     Rival firms 
____________________________________________________________________________  
Abnormal       Abnormal 
Day Return  t-statistic  Day  Return  t-statistic 
____________________________________________________________________________
-5  1.11   1.05   -5  -0.12  -1.45 
-4  1.59   1.50   -4   0.16   2.18* 
-3  1.63   1.53    -3  -0.05  -0.74 
-2  1.13   1.07   -2  -0.11  -1.45 
-1  1.38   1.27   -1  -0.09  -1.19 
____________________________________________________________________________                                                   
 0  2.19   2.06*     0  -0.08  -1.03 
____________________________________________________________________________                                                   
 1  4.31    4.05***    1  -0.24  -3.24*** 
 2 -1.75   -1.65     2  -0.11  -1.49 
 3 -0.58   -0.55     3  -0.13  -1.80* 
 4  2.23    2.09*     4   0.02   0.29 
 5 -0.63   -0.59     5  -0.10   1.33 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event Windows: 
       (0, 1)   6.49    4.32***    -0.31  -3.02** 
       (-1, 1)   7.87    4.27***    -0.40  -3.15*** 
(-250, -30)  59.83    3.79***    -2.82  -2.55** 
   (30, 250)  56.62    3.58***    -2.45  -2.22* 
____________________________________________________________________________                                                   
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Table 2 
Average abnormal earnings forecast revisions for industry rivals at  
reorganization announcements
 
We estimate average abnormal earnings forecast revisions based on a modification of the 
Ederington and Goh (1998) methodology surrounding the announcement month (Month 0) of a 
dividend omission.  The sample includes 3270 rivals during the announcement month between 
the years 1987 and 1998.  The mean abnormal forecast revision, AFRi,t = FRi,t – 
E(FRi,t|FRi,t-j,j=1,6), is reported where FRi,t = [(Fi,t – Fi,t-1)/Pi]*100, Fi,t is the median forecast in 
month t of earnings per share for the current fiscal year as reported by IBES, and Pi is the price 
per share six months prior to the reorganization date. E(FRi,t|FRi,t-j,j=1,6) is the expected 
forecast revision in month t, based on a six-month distributed lag of past forecast revisions 
estimated from a random sample.  Reported forecast revision estimates are actual estimates 
times 100.   
(*** denotes .01, ** denotes .05, and * denotes .10 levels of significance) 
 
  Abnormal 
  Forecast    
 Month Revision t-statistic n 
____________________________________________________________________________
 -6 -0.021 -0.99 3046 
 -5 -0.010 -0.48 3064 
 -4  0.005  0.24 3092 
 -3 -0.030 -1.59 3118 
 -2 -0.036 -1.68 3155 
 -1 -0.048 -2.17* 3191 
____________________________________________________________________________                                                   
  0          -0.038          -1.79     3237 
____________________________________________________________________________                                                   
 1           -0.037           -1.90*      3240 
  2 -0.032 -1.57 3256 
  3 -0.017 -1.00 3269 
  4 -0.022 -1.20 3252 
  5  0.019  1.07 3263 
  6  0.002  0.12 3263 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event Window: 
 (0,+3) -0.114 -2.96*** 3152 
____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional regressions of rivals’ average abnormal earnings forecast revisions and abnormal stock 
returns 
 
The dependent variable is the Rivals’ cumulative abnormal earnings forecast revisions from the 
month the sample company emerges from bankruptcy protection, Month 0, through Month +3.  
We estimate average abnormal earnings forecast revisions for rival companies of those 
emerging from bankruptcy protection based on a modification of the Ederington and Goh (1998) 
methodology.  The mean abnormal forecast revision, AFRi,t = FRi,t – E(FRi,t|FRi,t-j,j=1,6), is 
reported where FRi,t = [(Fi,t – Fi,t-1)/Pi]*100, Fi,t is the median forecast in month t of earnings per 
share for the current fiscal year as reported by IBES, and Pi is the price per share six months 
prior to the reorganization date. E(FRi,t|FRi,t-j,j=1,6) is the expected forecast revision in month t, 
based on a six-month distributed lag of past forecast revisions estimated from a random sample.  
We estimate abnormal stock returns using the market model over the period from Day -510 
through Day -251. (*** denotes .01, ** denotes .05, and * denotes .10 levels of significance) 
 
 
   Estimated     
   Coefficient  t-statistic  
____________________________________________________________________________  
Intercept  -0.0010 - 2.47**   
RCAR    0.0194   2.08**  
RCAR_PRE   0.0040   2.57***  
RCAR_POST   0.0002   0.21      
F statistic   10.119     
P-value  (.0001)    
Adjusted R2   .01     
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RCAR   = Rivals’ 3-day cumulative abnormal stock returns centered on the announcement day. 
RCAR_PRE   = Rivals’ pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns from Day -250 through -30. 
RCAR_POST   = Rivals’ post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns from Day +30 though +250. 
 
 
 
